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Diversity, Otherness and the Politics of
Recognition
Conference proceedings Baroncelli, Herder, Liberalism, Taylor, communitarianism, identity, otherness
Franco Manti
To Flavio Baroncelli, a friend I met only too late,
whose lively intellect, critical sense, friendliness
and clever  irony I just had time to appreciate.
 
The whole and the part*
In introducing his article “Il riconoscimento e i suoi sofismi”[1], Flavio Baroncelli identifies the di iculties experienced
by philosophical debate when dealing with the relationship between the whole and the part. He states: “For centuries,
philosophers have debated extensively on ‘the whole and the part’, and their debates might appear totally gratuitous to
the layperson. Does the whole or the part come first? In which sense ‘first’? Logical, axiological, temporal? What is
meant is hardly ever clear.”[2] The reference to the above-mentioned di iculties is to be taken seriously, since it takes us
back to the origins of philosophical thinking, when Plato, in his Sophist, develops the theory of the summa genera[3]
and originates a fundamental aspect of Western culture, still very relevant today, that is, comparative reasoning,
comparing in particular what is the same and what is other. This type of reasoning considers the other as not-being,
since it is a being that is other[4].
Referred back to human relationships and transferred from separate beings (individuals) to the whole − the community
absorbing the parts making it up to the point that it cannot conceive of their independent existence − the definition of
what unites us (same) and what divides us (other) is of great consequence on the anthropological, ethical and political
plane. It originates the distinction between us (those who identify themselves as belonging to a given community) and
them (those who are other than us)[5], which is based on comparison: they do not have some quality characterising us
or, conversely, have some quality that does not belong to us. They are therefore immediately identifiable as not us.
The debate between political liberalism and communitarianism, which is the backdrop of Baroncelli’s article, has much
to do with the above-mentioned way of defining both in terms of the individual-community relationship and in terms of
the relationship among di erent communities. This is not the place to look into detail at the terms of the debate
between liberals and communitarians and the specificities of the contributions by individual philosophers. To get an
idea of its extent, su ice it to mention the priority issue characterising it: should we favour justice over good, as the
former claim, or rather the opposite, as the latter say? Political liberalism is willing to acknowledge the pluralism of
comprehensive notions of good life (characterising individuals or groups) and to extinguish possible conflicts through
procedures based on the neutrality of the State, intended as a cooperative and voluntary association. For
communitarians, on the other hand, good must prevail over justice lest society be disrupted and means instrumental to
pursuing specific interests dominate. Hence it would not be possible to try to make a political community survive
independent of the telos determined by a unitary and all-embracing notion of good and by objectives with which
participants in the political community may identify. The community defines not only what they have as fellow citizens,
but also what they are− not a relationship they choose (as a voluntary association would be), but a tie they uncover, not
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a mere attribute, but a constitutive element of their identity, so that the whole prevails over the part and makes it
conceivable only in relation to the whole itself.
Since in the above-mentioned article Baroncelli posed the question of the whole and the part in relation to the
recognition and interpretation of it provided by communitarian philosophers, I will focus on the following
interconnected notions, which I believe to be crucial to deal with this topic: otherness, identity and recognition. The aim
of this analysis is to identify a perspective that may overcome the most blatant limitations of political liberalism, also in
the light of the issues posed by communitarianism, while adopting a liberal standpoint.
 
Otherness and translatability
At the dawn of modernity, with the discovery of America, Europe had to confront the “trauma” of otherness[6].  It was
basically dealt with by reassuringly changing the other into the di erent, transforming “the non-relation of otherness
into the relation of diversity, the incommensurable into the commensurable»[7]. It was on this basis that the debate on
the nature of the Indios, and later on the savages, was developed[8]. Independent of what they were considered to be,
the yardstick for their assessment was what was in them the same as or di erent from Europeans, in terms of physical
characteristics, culture, economic development.
Since otherness based on incommensurability between cultures[9] may provide reasons in favour of political liberalism
and the principle of (political) neutrality, I find it necessary to make it explicit what it is and which its ethical and
political implications are. According to P. Feyerabend, “[…]languages and the reaction patterns they involve are not
merely instruments for describing events (facts, states of a air), but that they are also shapers of events (facts, states of
a airs)[…]their ‘grammar’ contains a cosmology, a comprehensive view of the world, of society, of the situation of man
which influences thought, behaviour, perception.”[10]. This means that each linguistic universe represents a world of its
own, its descriptions are a way – the way in that universe – of “seeing” the world, but also a construction of the world. In
language, moreover, there can be covert classificationsoriginating“[…] patterned resistances to widely divergent points
of view’. If these resistances oppose not just the truth of the resisted alternatives but the presumption that an
alternative has been presented, then we have an instance of incommensurability.”[11].
It is therefore a question of distinguishing between possible alternatives within a linguistic universe or, in any case,
between translations already put in place, classifying the latter as typical of a weak otherness (or diversity), and the
non-existence of alternatives since other languages describe and determine other worlds. In the latter case, we might
be facing an instance of strong otherness and, in particular cases, of absolute otherness. A distinction is made between
strong and absolute otherness because the former is referred to realities which are used to be confronted with
translation, although they do not presuppose the existence of alternatives, Whereas the latter concerns cultures which
are the expression of groups of humans which have long been separated and are therefore not used to mutual
translation. These considerations allow us to understand how our recognition of individuals or cultures depends on
forming standard judgements, stereotypes and prejudice, developed according to a comparative criterion,within
linguistic universes. In addition, they may shed some light on how we may intend the criterion of truth, which cannot be
solely reduced to the correspondence between what is and what is a irmed, but which has to assume as fact also views
of the world which, within a certain linguistic universe, may seem to be bizarre.
When Cortés met Moteczuma[12], the latter was really convinced that a cosmic cycle was coming to an end and this
represented afact of fundamental importance for the conquest of the Aztec Empire by the Spaniards. Thanks to
Malinche’s[13] decisive help, Cortés very cleverly exploited Moteczuma’s convictions to his advantage, since he could
enter his linguistic universe and translate it. As is well known, the relationship between Cortés and Moteczuma ended
tragically. We should therefore ask ourselves this question: is it possible to have tolerant confrontation and dialogue
between culture, theories and comprehensive notions of good life that are mutually incommensurable? This opens up a
further question: which relationship (if any) can we establish between incommensurability and translatability?
According to H.G. Gadamer, translation of texts is an interpretation of them implying the activation of a hermeneutic
circle[14]. But how far may interpretation go before it turns into misrepresentation when you move from texts to the
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even more problematic translation between linguistic universes finding themselves in a state of strong or absolute
otherness?
A first step may be to “[…]recognize each other as a member of di erent language communities[…]”[15]; secondly, we
should refer this recognition to cultures to become aware of the type of otherness involved. It should be borne in mind
how translation does not concern individual words and their meanings nor formal logic understood as universal
language. Confrontation pertains to such logics, that is, the inherent structures of languages. This is the confrontation
making it possible to reshape ideas in one’s own language. This does not mean that there is commensurability, but that
languages “[…] can be bent in many directions and that understanding does not depend on any particular set of
rules.”[16]. As translation goes on, we could begin to understand why statements that to us are obscure, bizarre or even
meaningless have an explanation within the linguistic universe in which they are located. Here a word of warning may
be needed: “To translate a theory or worldview into one’s own language in not to make it one’s own.”[17]; furthermore,
translation will hardly be really complete.
Lastly, translation may make it possible to construct a new language. This may happen independent of an informed
decision[18], but also, in my view, as a result of an intentional process. On an ethical and political plane, the idea that
cultures are incommensurable, but that translation puts them in a relationship, allows for a conception of cultures as
open systems that import and export culture, that co-evolve and that may hybridise and originate new cultures. If
interculture is not to be dealt with in general and misleading terms, we should deem the linguistic transition operated
by translation the basis on which intercultural relations may be built. This may be carried out by maintaining the
centrality of the crucial principle for establishing a real intercultural relationship: the awareness of the otherness at the
heart of this process. Such awareness, like translation, refers back to the role of individuals. A process of dialogue and
hybridisation between cultures may be constructed only thanks to their experiences, sensitivity, care, to their
recognising themselves as bearers of a plurality of needs, interests, identities, to their recognising themselves as same
and other at the same time, as belonging to the same species, and as situated individuals, with a history, a background,
habits inherited by traditions. In other words, we should not consider communities from a holistic point of view as a
homogeneous and cohesive whole on the basis of a single cultural identity, but as a hologram, a network of relations
among individuals, groups, associations where communication, knowledge, di erent cultures and subcultures and
their translations uninterruptedly flow within the system and out of it, opening it up to the innovation engendered by
the combination of endogenous and exogenous factors.
 
Identity of the part or of the whole?  
In the light of what has been said, I believe Baroncelli had good reasons for thinking that the recognition philosophies
and politics proposed by communitarians were based on rhetorical patterns that may be summed up by two strategies:
“[…] the former is providing a poor image of the liberal enemy; the latter is presenting oneself as the champions of the
cultural minorities the enemy cannot or will not protect.”[19]
Here is where two questions may be posed: which is the relationship between identity and recognition? Can we deal
with individuals and communities in the same way, that is, moving from the recognition of individual rights
characterising the liberal tradition to the recognition of cultural rights for each community? In this connection,
Baroncelli emphasises a relevant feature: identity may be individual or collective (cultural, religious, etc.). Meditation on
communitarianism, a holistic view holding that individuals are identifiable only as members of a community, as parts of
a whole teleologically shaped by a comprehensive view of good life, implies coming to terms with the fact that
communitarianism seems to embrace solidaristic values and be posed as a moral and political philosophy not
proposing a conservative and illiberal view based on the community prevailing over individuals, but as a philosophy
which, by opposing individualism, thehomo economicus,the preposterousness of cultural and e political majorities and
Western modernity, defends, as Baroncelli says, the rights of the “parts that are also wholes”, of the cultural
communities struggling to survive[20].
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Individuals need other people to recognise what they are to perceive themselves as somebodies; what is more, individuals
are mostly what other people recognise them to be; and they exist only within a culture, a set of shared values, hopes and
fears, of life projects in common with others. […] when di erent communities live on the same territory, they need mutual
respect and recognition […] For communitarians, this is tantamount to saying that the di erent value and sign systems we
call cultures should be considered worthy of endless survival[21].
Hence communitarianism poses itself as a philosophy and as politics able to defend the community and the individuals
making them up as parts of a whole, a form of non-abstract individualism, since it considers individuals as concrete and
situated. In his critique to the foundations of liberalism[22], Sandel refers to Kant’s and Mill’s philosophies as
particularly influential also for later developments of liberalism and for contemporary liberalism. The “deontological
liberalism” of the former, characterised by the prevalence of justice over moral and political ideals, connects the two
di erent meanings that may be assigned to deontology: the moral and the founding meaning. The former proposes
deontology as a first level ethics by which certain duties (and prohibitions) are categorical and therefore have
unconditional priority over other moral or practical needs; the latter defines deontology as a form of justification the
founding principles of which do not presuppose a final aim or purpose, thus, no specific notion of good life. To put it
shortly, according to Sandel, the prevalence of justice over good characterising Kantianism and related contemporary
philosophical approaches, such as Rawls’ theory of justice[23], should have a foundation that precedes all empirical
ends, including the pursuit of happiness.
From a Kantian perspective, the reply to this objection, concerning its foundations, is the subject of practical reason as
the subject of an independent will, able to make choices that are not empirically conditional. This, however, poses a
problem: to justify this view of the subject, a metaphysics of the transcendental moral subject would be needed, which,
however, being noumenal, is not an unattainable object of knowledge, as it were. In this respect, what is also
problematic is the particular version of the Kantian deontological approach provided by Rawls in A Theory of Justice:
separating Kant’s theory from its background based on transcendental idealism to repropose it within the canons of a
sensible empiricism[24]. A Hume-like deontology, where basic principles are derived from a hypothetical situation of
discernment, the original position[25] characterised by conditions bound to produce a certain result suitable for real
human beings. According to Sandel, Rawls fails in his attempt: the original position, a highly abstract hypothesis, only
revives the incorporeal and noumenal subject it is trying to avoid[26].
As far as Mill and utilitarianism are concerned, Sandel underlines how he rea irms the primacy of justice starting from a
vision according to which having a right means having something whose possession society must guarantee[27]. The
reason of such duty on the part of society lies in general usefulness[28]. Justice is therefore considered by Mill as the
most sacred and binding part of morals, because its requirements are at the top of social utility and are the most
binding of all[29]. In addition, the principles of justice, like other moral principles, are teleologically oriented towards
the pursuit of happiness, which is the only desirable thing in terms of ends. Hence justice is what utility requires and if,
in some specific cases, another moral duty may prevail over some principles of justice, it is because it depends on
happiness[30].The conclusion Sandel makes is, very shortly, that the primacy assigned to justice by liberalism, in its
variety and in its presumption of neutrality with respect to notions of good life, lies in a particular conception of person
and of the abstract and disembodied moral subject of the strictly deontological view by Kant and Kantians; this appears
to be too focussed on a teleological view where justice maintains its primacy because it is useful to the pursuit of
individual and social happiness in the utilitarian approach.
According to Sandel, both versions of liberalism fail to e ectively answer the question on what type of subjects we
should be in order to make sense of justice rather than reduce it, on the one hand, to pure proceduralism, and, on the
other, to calculations of social (welfare) utility[31]. Since individuals are situated rather than abstract subjects the
primacy assigned to justice by the various forms of liberalism is misleading. Hence the fundamental function he assigns
to thecommunity. It defines not only what individuals have as fellow citizens, but also what they are, not a relationship
they choose (e.g., a voluntary partnership), but a bond they discover, not a mere attribute, but a constitutive part of
their identity. In my opinion, the consequences of Sandel’s critique of liberalism are the incapability of recognising
di erences and alterities. Based on the neutrality principle, on the one hand this would condemn us to moral
undecidedness, on the other its concreteness would end up imposing – which is only seemingly a paradox – a particular
vision coinciding, as mentioned above, with the values of Western modernity considered to be universal and neutral (a
blatant example would be human rights in opposition to community cultural rights because of the former’s abstract
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nature). In Sandel’s account, the double caricature ofliberalism mentioned by Baroncelli[32] emerges: the liberalism
that is “too abstract” (by Kant and Kantians), the one that is “too concrete” (by Mill and utilitarians). What also emerges
is an aspect he rightly emphasises: “Actually, there are liberalisms which are not neutral neither in practice (which is
inevitable) nor   programmatically (which is evitable) and which do not have any superior universality to counter the
particularistic and separatist drives by which they are challenged.”[33]. This concept is not elaborated in Baroncelli’s
paper; given its complexity, however, it is worthy of a few considerations I will make very briefly[34].
The question of neutrality is indeed crucial for answering the objections made by communitarianism and by Sandel in
particular. First, this question needs to deal with the nature of politics and of its relationship with morals. I believe the
following statement by Larmore provides a good summary of a liberal view I personally share:
[…]our political thinking should not rely on all the truth we believe we have at hand, at least when it concerns the aimsof
politics. What I mean is our thinking on politics aiming to establish the rules and principles of political society in such a way
that those entering this political partnership will be able to see, discuss and recognise these principles; in this sense I
intend political aims.[35].
Thus, politics concerns a sphere of human relationships in which the aim of decisions is not answering the question
“how should I behave to others?”, but the definition of institutions, constitutions, rules and laws designed so as to make
living together and cooperation possible among citizens expressing needs, interests, hierarchies in moral values,
notions of good life which are mutually heterogeneous, incommensurable, sometimes openly conflictual, and wishing
to act according to their needs and beliefs. More specifically, while the result of a debate outside the political sphere
may not necessarily be bounding, also because it is not to be taken for granted that agreement or shared views are
reached, in politics decisions binding for all citizens and the latter consider it legitimate to have recourse to force,
coertion and sanctions to ensure behaviours conform to rules decided on by politics. Coercion in specific and well-
defined cases is usually acceptable for all citizens, as long as it does not compel dissenters to behaviours that are in
contrast with their morals or renouncing options that are consistent with the latter, provided that the latter do not
jeopardise social and fellow citizens’ peace, or that dissenters, in case they would become a majority, are willing to
accept the rules and practices characterising tolerance. This also takes into consideration that political decisions have
feedback on our private lives and may influence them so much that our freedom may be significantly limited or
increased. What has been said on the nature of political decision making allows for more clarity on the neutrality
principle. It should not be intended in absolute terms, but as an exclusively political principle only related to
controversial (reasonable) conceptions of good life[36].
Thus, any exception to the principle of political neutrality dismisses the legitimate use of coercion and undermines an
essential function of the State: guaranteeing the opportunity to pursue one’s projects and lifestyles without harming
others to all citizens, also independent of their community belonging, and allowing those who so wish to distance
oneselves from it. The State being politically neutral with respect to what separates us from an ethical point of view,
does not embrace a specific view – however mainstream − of good life in society, and provides everybody with a
legalised space for dissenting in the form of conscientious objection. When it is not about abstaining from doing
something, but acting in a certain way, if there is no danger for social peace, there should not be legal constraints[37].
It must be emphasised that, however specific political decision making is, it is based on deontological or
consequentialist moral reasons. The political neutrality principle establishes itself as a deontological principle: when
one is called to making political decisions they should take it as a duty to observe this principle as one of the
foundations of political decision making. By the Seventeenth Century, it had become clear that those who are not
willing to concede tolerance when they constitute a majority cannot claim tolerance for themselves and their own
group when they constitute a minority[38]. In addition, those who are not willing to accept the principle of political
neutrality as a deontological principle pave the way for those who have political recourse, at least on some topics, to all
the truth they think they are entrusted with, when they are enabled to do so. The duty of respecting the neutrality
principle also makes it possible to preserve the moral principle by which we cannot demand that others do what we are
not willing to accept for ourselves, that a given behaviour is imposed by force of law on me that I do not share in terms
of deep moral loyalty. The interpretation of the neutrality principle I propose seems to me to respond to the objections
made by Sandel on this principle, also because this way “[…]we can circumvent one of the damaging paradoxes of later
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liberal theory, namely, its defense of political neutrality by appeal to ideals of the persons that are themselves rightly
controversial.”[39], such as the Kantian one of the person as a transcendental moral subject or the perfectionist one by
J.S. Mill of the person as a progressive subject perfecting themselves by having an opportunity to experiment life
projects[40].
 
The recognition “leap”: from individuals to communities
The second strategy enacted by communitarians,the one on which Baroncelli dwells the most,consists in a theory and
practice defending the cultural minorities the liberal enemy cannot and will not defend. The immediate reference is to
those cultures “[…] whose identity is objectively jeopardised by illegitimate external agents.”[41] Such discourse is
founded on the idea of cultures conceived as disadvantaged minorities. Baroncelli emphasises the weak points of
communitarian rhetoric underlining how it avoids answering the question: “does this line of thought conceptually apply
only to minorities, or are the same arguments just as sound if applied to majorities as well?”[42]
The answer is that communitarian arguments applying to minorities will then apply in the same way to majorities. This
is because, from a communitarian perspective,every culture, even the most blatantly majority, may be conceived at all
times by somebody within this culture as having the same urgencies as a minority. In other words, if the central reason
is the defence and survival of cultures, communitarians do not have arguments against defending majority cultures.
Thinking from within each culture, “[…] the arguments based on the need for envisaging a future for one’s culture apply
to the Eskimo culture in the same way as they apply to capitalism causing the extinction of the Eskimo culture.”[43]. In
so doing, communitarians interpret cultures as super-individuals: this is the only way of dealing with the rights of
cultures, but within each single culture, beyond the way it is described from the outside, there are a large number of
reasons why it should be perceived as endangered, and in the name of “danger” intolerance may be rationally
justified[44].
If the individualism and cosmopolitarianism typical of liberal thinking cannot but give up to this transformation – the
death of cultures – the indefinite survival of a given culture implies the possibility of supporting arguments against
tolerance by basing them on the right to survival and by presenting them rationally within that culture. The historical
examples of higher tolerance than a liberal regime may ensure feature peaceful coexistence of religious communities
such as the millet system in the Turkish Empire[45]. Without discussing in detail whether this is an actual case of
tolerance, at least in the modern sense of the term, I would like to emphasise two aspects: the former, considered by
Baroncelli too, states that both the examples made and the ideal proposed by communitarians takes it for granted that
individuals outside the community to which they belong are nothing and have no rights. They do not exist because they
are not allowed to, and have no exit rights:
 […] where there is no territorial state assigning rights and civil and criminal responsibility to the individual as such, it is by
no means possible to give an individual the right to abandon their community any time. […] if the misty area of intellectual
communitarianism is abandoned and attention is focussed on real communitarianism, by which I mean the “serious” one
by extremists, it is to be immediately understood that the logic behind it is that of exclusion. Either the individual or the
community.[46]
As a consequence, while the recognition of rights to individuals may grant to those who identify with a particular
community some typical advantages of communitarian life, it is not possible to grant anything to individuals as such
under a communitarian perspective.
In addition, systems such as the millet hold as long as a strong central authority imposes them and make sure that they
are complied with. Examples from the Turkish Empire and Yugoslavia a er Titus’ death are quite telling. In short, with
its sophistry, the rhetoric of communitarianism posing itself as a political theory and practice the aim of which is to
defend weak, marginalised and neglected identities, ends up by making up arguments to the advantage of extremist,
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intolerant views in which the part (the individual) is subordinate to the whole. As A. Sen suggests, identity and, in
particular, monoidentity, especially of a religious nature, can kill – and kill with abandon[47].
 
An impossible synthesis                                                                                                        
Provided that communitarian analyses on the limits of liberalism must be taken seriously and, as shown above, are
important to make the limits of some liberal views comprehensible, I would look into some detail into a question, to
which Baroncelli replies negatively in the light of the above-mentioned considerations, that is, the possible integration
between the communitarian and the liberal logic to give birth to a new and improved synthesis. Under this perspective,
a comparison with C. Taylor’s elaborations appears to be interesting[48]. The key concepts at the heart of the Canadian
philosopher’s treatment are recognition, identity, authenticity and di erence. His attempt consists in relating them to
make the limits of liberalism apparent and proposing a new form of liberalism that may be able to overcome
individualism and valorise belonging and, with it, cultural rights.
Although his appears to be the most serious e ort to integrate liberalism and communitarianism, it is not convincing for
two reasons: 1. It does not e ectively counter criticism such as that advanced by Baroncelli; 2. It cannot utterly deal with
the questions posed by otherness. According to Taylor, recognition is the central feature of multicultural societies and it
poses more and more pressure because of the relationship between recognition and identity,the latter being “a vision a
person has of what they are, of their fundamental characteristics defining them as a human being”. Identity is partially
shaped by recognition, but also by lack of recognition on the part of other people or groups.Recognition overcomes
respect and appears as “a vital human need”, since an individual or a group may be harmed if the people or societies
around them construct a humiliating, limited or diminished image of them condemning them to low self-esteem.
Taylor underlines how recognition is a consequence of modernity in the light of two factors: 1. The collapse of social
hierarchies made legitimate by honour as opposed to the universalist and egalitarian notion of human dignity; 2. The
rise of individualised identity which can be expressed as an ideal of authenticity and loyalty to oneself. (1) implies
democratic culture’s essential need for equal recognition,which today is posed a demand for cultural and gender
equality; (2) refers back to the theory of moral sentiments (intended as means the aim of which is acting rightly),
according to which we need to be in close touch with our sentiments if we want to become complete human beings.
Referring explicitly to Herder and, more generally, to Romantic expressivism, Taylor highlights how each person has
their own measure, and therefore not being faithful to oneself makes one lose their main reason for living, what being
human is to them: every single voice of ours has something unique to say.
Herder’s fundamental contribution to putting recognition politics at the centre of attention lies in extending that vision
from individual to peoples. Everybody has their own originality and culture. A people, like an individual, should be
faithful to oneself. Moreover, discovering one’s own authenticity is not a monological process. We define our identity by
negotiating with, and sometimes fighting against, what significant others want from us. Therefore identity connotes
itself as the background against which our tastes, desires, opinions and wishes acquire a meaning. The rise of the
modern notion of identity requires recognition of unrepeatable identity, di erent from everybody else’s, either
individual or group, and at the same time poses a paradox:we take note of the existence of something universal
(everybody has their own identity) because we recognise something that is uniquely one’s own for everybody. “The
universal need promotes taking note of specificity”. The politics of di erence redefines non–discrimination as something
that compels us to make of distinctions the basis for di erent treatment.
 The aim of these policies is not transient; rather, the aim is preserving and cultivating di erence forever on the basis of
the legitimate aspiration that one’s identity may never be lost. Classical liberalism cannot cope with the politics of
di erence because, from an ethical point of view, its commitment is procedural: we are compelled to treat one another
equally, independent of the idea we have of our aims; on the other hand, the substantive commitment regarding life
aims and what we deem worthy of fighting together is neglected. Liberal neutrality would therefore consist in the lack
of the State’s and society’s interference in the a irmation of individual dignity, based on independence,that is, the
ability of individuals to figure out an idea of good life for themselves. But this proceduralist liberalism, pursuing politics
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of equal respect among individuals, would not welcome di erence, would impose a uniform application of rules
defining rights, would view collective rights with suspicion and would not be able to accommodate the aspiration to
survival of societies separated on the basis of the di erent conceptions of good life characterising them.
In addition, Taylor believes liberalism itself is not completely neutral: the separation of State and religion is
incomprehensible in other contexts, such as the Islamic culture. A new kind of liberalism therefore becomes necessary,
which he defines Liberalism 2, which maintains the habeas corpus, but distinguishes fundamental rights from the wide
variety of immunities and presumptions of equal treatment. It is not a procedural liberalism, but one founded on
judgments concerning good life, and in this sense these are judgments in which the integrity of cultures plays an
important role. As a consequence, in a context where societies are increasingly multicultural and open to multinational
migrations, what is needed is not only that cultures survive, but also that everybody recognise the equal value of
di erent cultures and take note that they are precious.
The criterion for recognition refers to all those human cultures which have nurtured whole societies for a considerable
lapse of time and have something important to say to each human being. Taylor highlights how this is a presumptive
thesis, that is, an assumption with which we should approach the study of any other culture while aware that a real
value judgment presupposes the fusion of normative horizons; it also presupposes that studying the other has
transformed us so much that we do not judge by our original criteria any more. This transformation would be possible
through the presumption of value of cultures. All cultures that have given a meaning horizon to a large number of
human beings for a long time deserve respect and admiration. For this reason, we should become aware of the limits of
our part in the entire history of humankind, also through comparative cultural studies.
 
A non-liberal liberalism 
The proposed integration of liberalism and communitarianism implied in Liberalism 2 is based on the acceptance of two
assumptions that are by no means to be taken for granted and should be demonstrated: 1. Individuals, like cultures,
have an identity; 2. Cultures are closed and impervious systems. Actually, the single-a iliation view is hardly justifiable:
everybody belongs to a number of groups, nor it is demonstrable that a group has a natural primacy over others, which
means we are not able to decide independently on the relative importance of the di erent categories of belonging. The
importance we recognise to an identity depends on its social context and, in any case, not all identities necessarily have
lasting importance. Finally, each individual not only does not possess a single or a predominant identity, but has to do
with a plurality of identities that are, by the way, mobile.
We all constantly make choices on priorities to be given to our a iliations. In the light of these considerations, the
argument on faithfulness to oneself is diminished, at least in the sense intended by Taylor. It is also questionable that
the modern view of identity has created politics of di erence. Communitarianism proposes two distinct but related
lines of argumentation: 1. Individuals only have access to the notions of identity of the community they belong to:
community and culture determine the reasoning and ethical models available to them; 2. Identity is something you
discover. Particularly, community identity has an overwhelming importance and therefore ethical assessment is only
possible within community values and norms. This is conflict with the modern idea that ethical pluralism is inherent in
human rationality and cannot be reduced to the observance of traditions and community belonging.
As far as the view of cultures as closed and impervious systems is concerned, it does not take into account that cultures
are not monolithic, but very complex (su ice it to mention subcultures) and, as it were, mobile and in constant
coevolution. It is fact that cultures relate to one another when they get in contact, thus producing, in some cases, fully-
fledged hybridizations – e.g. the relationship between Greek and Roman culture and between the latter cultures and the
Judeo-Christian culture.
Cultures therefore cannot be treated as endangered animal or plant species, and cannot be “ecologically” defended as
if they were protected species. There is a sharp distinction between cultural freedom and the importance of the
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preservation of cultures. In the end, also Taylor realises this when he introduces his presumptive thesis. Not all cultures
would have a right to survival, but only those cultures which have given a meaning horizon to a large number of human
beings, over a long period of time. How this sort of classification may be structured remains quite obscure. The only
clue is reference to a comparative method, but, as mentioned above, comparativism belongs to a specific cultural view
and is not free from ethnocentrism. Thus Taylor’s communitarian synthesis comes down to the far from democratic and
respectful of di erences idea that somebody (who?) may decide which culture is worthy of survival and which not. In
this respect, I believe the most serious reply possible is taking note that the cultural richness of our world cannot be
subdivided and categorised according to one single criterion.
Pursuing this view may cause conflict. On the contrary, imagining ourselves as  di erently di erent, to the point of
realising cultural otherness, wherever the latter may emerge, and being willing to translate may allow us to understand
the pluralities of human identity and lie at the basis of the recognition politics of a number of issues: these pluralities
are cross-cultural; we are bound by our belonging to the same species; the ecosystem is our common home and we are
all called to take care of it. If we value the heritage of modernity and focus our attention on freedom (including cultural
freedom), then the importance of cultural diversity cannot be absolute, but must vary consistently with its causal
linkages to human freedom and its weight in decision-making processes by single individuals. The relationship between
cultural freedom and cultural diversity is not necessarily uniformly defined.                                         
In the name of cultural diversity, should we support conservatism and any tradition? Violation of freedom may also be
induced by the tyranny of conformism to tradition, the more so if it is legally protected on the basis of the recognition of
community cultural rights.
 
Conclusions
The unveiling of the sophistry supporting the politics of recognition championed by communitarians does not eliminate
the need for rethinking classical liberalism in the light the big questions we are confronted with today. The basic idea is
that we are not necessarily bound to moral estrangement based on our views of good and on our ethnic and cultural
belonging. The perspective is that of policies recognising pluralism and cultural plurality, making it possible not only to
live together peacefully, but also to promote relations beyond nation States. In this connection, Sartori’s words seem to
be very important:
Pluralism will not identify with a multicultural descent, but rather with interculturalism [:::]. What does our European
identity, our “feeling we are European”, depend upon? What created it? Interculturalism. And the same goes for Western
identity, for our “being Western”[…]. Multiculturalism leads to Bosnia and Balkanisation; it is interculturalism that leads to
Europe. Let us be careful, then. The multicultural project is really disruptive, as it reverses the pluralistic direction
substantialising liberal civilisation. And it is really striking that this disruption is a irmed and legitimated by philosophers
proclaiming themselves liberals[49].
In my view, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that, to get a convincing reply, communitarian claims should
envisage a clarification of the neutrality principle, its justification and its nature and should take into consideration the
social imagination of Western modernity. As to neutrality and its justification, the matter has been discussed above
while looking at Kant’s and Mill’s visions. As to its nature, it must be made clear that it is to be intended as exclusively
political (not ethical) and related to controversial notions of good life. In this respect one may make sense of the
separation between religion and politics that is accepted also in countries with an Islamic majority and represents a
well-accepted guarantee to those who practise this religion in countries where they are a minority. In this connection,
one should bear in mind that there is not only one Islam and that it is inappropriate to refer to the Islamic community as
if it were a homogeneous entity.
As far as the social imagination is concerned, we should take note of the crisis and the limits of what modernity has
handed on to us. Here we will not look into detail at such a complex question concerning globalisation, the ethics-
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economics-politics relationship, inequalities, justice, citizenship, and many other topics. I will briefly look at the moral
order acting as a backdrop for social imagination. Taylor has highlighted, and in my view rightly so, how the backdrop
for social imagination in Western modernity is represented by the doctrine of natural law by Grotius and Locke. What
Taylor fails to underline is that that vision was not meant to provide a moral order of the world with which the Western
community could identify, but the principles on which the modern State was to be founded. These moral principles are
certainly to be considered prepolitical, subtracted to contractual negotiation and constitutive of a shared civil ethos, but
they acknowledged the discover of religious pluralism and of the notions of good life the State had to follow to
guarantee the freedom, rights and private life of individuals.
The question might be asked how to envisage a shared civil ethos in a time of mobility, rapid obsolescence, uncertainty,
plurality of decision makers beyond nation States? A promising view, worthy of study and elaboration, is E. Morin’s.
First, he states the need “to abandon the obsessive idea of a project perfectly encapsulating the form of society to be
constructed, in favour of the idea that political action may make new possible forms of freedom and solidarity
emerge”[50]. What seems to me to be relevant is that Morin thinks that a new planetary consciousness is necessary, that
is based on solidarity in the relations among humans and between humans and nature. What should be developed is
what he calls an “ethics of reliance”[51]. But which principles may provide the foundation of these relations and may at
least potentially be accepted in universal terms? First of all, human rights as a background for an idea of citizenship no
longer constrained by fragmentation, but supranational and, in perspective, planetary[52].
This perspective is all the more relevant nowadays since “For the first time in human history the universal has become a
concrete reality: it is the objective inter-solidarity of humankind, in which the global fate of the planet decides the
individual destinies of nations and in which the individual destinies of nations upset or change the global destiny.»[53].
The suggestions of Morin’s “planetary ethics”[54] with its nine commandments[55] make it possible, on the one hand,
to consider the emergencies of our time in unitary terms, on the other, to identify a possible pathway for further
civilisation for the whole of humanity. In short, awareness that the earth is our home country and that the destiny of our
species cannot be separated by the environment implies taking on ethical and political responsibility regarding the
exploitation of resources, pollution, the development model to be used; the idea of world citizenship requires
progressive liberation from national belonging to reach human belonging without this causing the disappearance of
cultural pluralism which would rather become the basis for the development of intercultural relations.
This approach is therefore not holistic, but hologrammatic, because it valorises the relations network among all the
components of the ecosystem, starting from human beings (as individuals and as a species). Thus, not only the whole
does not prevail over parts and individuals, but is the ever changing result of the relations network existing among
them. It is a way of providing a positive answer to Baroncelli’s concerns about the holistic vision characterising
communitarians:
Through the powerful philosophical machine that has made the argument for the concrete and primary existence of the
Whole prestigious as opposed to the secondary and abstract existence of the part, we are used to taking the metaphors of
cultures as individuals seriously. There is, however, a fatal di erence: while the claim that an individual’s life should be
earthly and eternal at one time is usually considered foolish, thus very little popular, the claim that a culture should be at
once earthly and eternal seems much more reasonable at a first glance; it is therefore much more infectious and
dangerous[56].
*Translated from Italian into English by Ilaria Rizzato, University of Genoa
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